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ABSTRACT
Learning in a multi-agent system is challenging because agents
are simultaneously learning and the environment is not stationary,
undermining convergence guarantees. To address this challenge,
this paper presents a new gradient-based learning algorithm, called
Gradient Ascent with Shrinking Policy Prediction (GA-SPP), which
augments the basic gradient ascent approach with the concept of
shrinking policy prediction. The key idea behind this algorithm is
that an agent adjusts its strategy in response to the forecasted strat-
egy of the other agent, instead of its current one. GA-SPP is shown
formally to have Nash convergence in larger settings than existing
gradient-based multi-agent learning methods. Furthermore, unlike
existing gradient-based methods, GA-SPP’s theoretical guarantees
do not assume the learning rate to be infinitesimal.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Multi-agent learning (MAL) is concerned with a set of agents that
learn to maximize their expected rewards. There are a number of
important applications that involve MAL, including competitive
settings such as self-play in AlphaZero [23] and generative ad-
versarial networks in deep learning [15, 20], cooperative settings
such as when learning to communicate [13, 25] and multiplayer
game [14], or some mix of the two [17, 26]. Although promising em-
pirical results, establishing a theoretical guarantee of convergence
for MAL, especially for gradient-based methods, is fundamentally
challenging because of its non-stationary environment.
Recent multi-agent learning (MAL) algorithms [7, 9–11, 19, 22]
with satisfactory empirical results are proposed, but most of them
do not provide theoretical analyses of convergence. There are only
a few worksthat provide theoretical results before them. Singh et
al. [24] first consider the theoretical convergence of gradient-based
methods in MAL. After that, several variants [1, 4, 5, 24, 27] are
proposed and they provide theoretical convergence in general-sum
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games, but theoretical guarantees are restricted in 2-agent, 2-action
games and they assume that the learning rate is infinitesimal, which
is not practical. Some other online learning algorithms [8, 12, 16]
have also been proposed with theoretical guarantees, but just for
specific settings, such as congestion games and potential games.
In this paper, we propose a new multi-agent learning algorithm
that augments a basic gradient ascent algorithm with shrinking
policy prediction, called Gradient Ascent with Shrinking Policy
Prediction (GA-SPP). The key idea behind this algorithm is that
an agent adjusts its strategy in response to the forecasted strategy
of the other agent, instead of its current one. This paper makes
three major novelties. First, to our best knowledge, GA-SPP is the
first gradient-ascent MAL algorithm with a finite learning rate that
provides convergence guarantee in general-sum games. Second, GA-
SPP provides convergence guarantee in larger games than existing
gradient-ascent MAL algorithms, which include m × n positive
semi-definite games, a class of 2 × n general-sum games, and 2 × 2
general-sum games. Finally, GA-SPP guarantees to converge to a
Nash Equilibrium when converging in anym×n general-sum game.
Although GA-SPP shares some similar ideas about using policy
prediction with IGA-PP [27] and the extra-gradient method [2], it
has several major differences from them. For example, apart from
using a finite step size, another significant difference between GA-
SPP and IGA-PP is that forecasted strategies of the opponent are
projected to the valid probability space. This improvement enables
GA-SPP’s Nash convergence when converging, which does not
hold for IGA-PP. In contrast to the extra-gradient approach, GA-
SPP uses shrinking prediction lengths which can be different from
the policy update rate. This improvement makes GA-SPP not only
more flexible in practice but also stronger in terms of theoretical
guarantees.
Like IGA-PP, we assume that agents know the other agent’s
strategy and its current strategy gradient, but we do not require the
learning rate to be infinitesimal. Even though GA-SPP needs some
restricted assumptions, it pushes forward the state of the art of
MAL with theoretical analysis. We expect that our work can shed a
light for theoretical understanding of dynamics and complexity of
MAL problems and like IGA-PP and WoLF-IGA [6], can encourage
broadly applicable multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms.
Our proposed learning algorithm also provides a different approach
for computing Nash Equilibiria of subsets of larger games, other
than well-established offline algorithms [18, 21], whose computa-
tion complexity increases sharply with the number of actions.
Notation
We use following notations in this paper:
∆ denotes the valid strategy space (i.e., a simplex).
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Π∆:ℜn → ∆ denotes the convex projection to the valid space,
Π∆[x] = arдminz ∈∆∥x − z∥.
P∆(x , v) denotes the projection of a vectorv on x ∈ ∆,
P∆(x , v) = limη→0
Π∆[x + ηv] − x
η
.
(v1;v2) denotes
(
v1
v2
)
, wherev1, v2 are column vectors.
2 GRADIENT ASCENT
We begin with a brief overview of normal-form games and then
review the basic gradient ascent algorithm.
2.1 Normal-Form Games
A 2-agent,m ×n -action, general-sum normal-form game is defined
by a pair of matrices
R =

r11 ... r1n
... ... ...
rm1 ... rmn
 and C =

c11 ... c1n
... ... ...
cm1 ... cmn

specifying the payoffs for the row agent and the column agent,
respectively. The agents simultaneously select an action from their
available set, and the joint action of the agents determines their
payoffs according to their payoff matrices. If the row agent selects
action a ∈ {1, ..., m} and the column agent selects action b ∈
{1, ..., n}, respectively, then the row agent receives a payoff rab
and the column agent receives a payoff cab .
The agents can choose actions stochastically based on some prob-
ability distribution over their available actions. This distribution is
said to be a mixed strategy. Let αi ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability of
choosing the i-th action by the row agent and βj ∈ [0, 1] denote the
probability of choosing the j-th action by the column agent, where
i ∈ {1, ..., m − 1}, j ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, ∑m−11 αi ≤ 1, ∑n−11 βj ≤ 1.
We use ∆1 to denote a m-1 dimensional simplex and ∆2 to denote
a n-1 dimensional simplex. This (m − 1) × (n − 1) representation is
equivalent to them × n representation, and, following the previous
work on gradient-based methods, we choose the former one. Let
α = [α1 ... αm−1]T, em−1 = [1 ... 1]T,
β = [β1 ... βn−1]T, en−1 = [1 ... 1]T,
where the dimension of em−1 ism − 1, the dimension of en−1 is
n − 1.
Then α ∈ ∆1, β ∈ ∆2. With a joint strategy (α , β), the row
agent’s and column agent’s expected payoffs are
Vr (α , β) = (α ; 1 − eTm−1α )TR(β ; 1 − eTn−1β),
Vc (α , β) = (α ; 1 − eTm−1α )TC(β ; 1 − eTn−1β).
(1)
A joint strategy (α ∗, β∗) is called a Nash equilibrium if for any
mixed strategyα of the row agent,Vr (α ∗, β∗) ≥ Vr (α , β∗), and for
any mixed strategy β of the column agent,Vc (α ∗, β∗) ≥ Vc (α ∗, β).
It is well-known that every game has at least one Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Learning using Gradient Ascent in Iterated
Games
In an iterated normal-form game, agents repeatedly play the same
game. Each agent seeks to maximize its expected payoff in response
to the strategy of the other agent. Using the basic gradient ascent
algorithm, a agent can increase its expected payoff by updating its
strategy with a step size along the gradient of the current strategy.
The gradient is computed as the partial derivative of the agent’s
expected payoff with respect to its strategy:
∂αVr (α , β) = ∂Vr (α , β)
∂α
= (Im−1 em−1)R(β ; 1 − eTn−1β),
∂βVc (α , β) =
∂Vc (α , β)
∂β
= (In−1 en−1)CT(α ; 1 − eTm−1α ),
(2)
where Im−1 is (m-1)-order identity matrix and In−1 is (n-1)-order
identity matrix.
If (αk , βk ) are the strategies on the k-th iteration and both
agents use gradient ascent, then the new strategies will be:
αk+1 = Π∆1 [αk + η∂αVr (αk , βk )],
βk+1 = Π∆2 [βk + η∂βVc (αk , βk )],
(3)
where η is the gradient step size. If the updates move the strategies
out of the valid probability space, the function Π∆ will project it
back.
Singh et al. [24] analyzed the gradient ascent algorithm by exam-
ining the dynamics of the strategies in the case of an infinitesimal
step size (limη→0). This algorithm is called Infinitesimal Gradient
Ascent (IGA). IGA cannot converge in some 2-agent 2-action zero-
sum game. GIGA-WoLF and IGA-PP extended IGA and provide
theoretical guarantee of Nash equilibrium in 2-agent 2-action game
through similar methods. However, these algorithms require a in-
finitesimal step size, which is not practical. We will describe a new
gradient ascent algorithm that enables the agents’ strategies to
converge to a Nash equilibrium with a finite step size in a larger
game setting.
3 GRADIENT ASCENTWITH SHRINKING
POLICY PREDICTION (GA-SPP)
As shown in Eq. 3, the gradient used by IGA to adjust the strategy
is based on current strategies. Suppose that an agent can estimate
the change direction of the opponent’s strategy, i.e., its strategy
derivative, in addition to its current strategy. Then the agent can
forecast the opponent’s strategy and adjust its own strategy in
response to the forecasted strategy. With this idea, we design a
gradient ascent algorithm with shrinking policy prediction (GA-
SPP). Its updating rule consists of three steps.
In Step 1, the new derivative terms with γ serve as a short-term
prediction of the opponent’s strategy. If the opponent’s forecasted
strategy is out of boundary of simplex, it will be projected back to
the valid space.
In Step 2, agents update their strategies on the basis of the fore-
casted strategy of its opponent.
In Step 3, agents terminate or adjust their prediction lengths. If
predicted strategies are equal to the current strategies, the algo-
rithm will terminate. Step 3 can make sure GA-SPP only converges
to Nash equilibrium (NE) instead of other points. Because when
(αk+1, βk+1) = (αk , βk ), GA-SPP will stop, if there is no Step 3,
then (αk+1, βk+1) , (αk , βk ) may happen. In this situation, GA-
SPP may converge to a non-NE point. We will prove this property
of GA-SPP in Proposition 1.
Algorithm 1: Updating rule of GA-SPP
1 αk+1 = Π∆1 [αk + γk∂αVr (αk , βk )];
βk+1 = Π∆2 [βk + γk∂βVc (αk , βk )];
2 αk+1 = Π∆1 [αk + η∂αVr (αk , βk+1)];
βk+1 = Π∆2 [βk + η∂βVc (αk+1, βk )];;
3
if (αk+1, βk+1) == (αk , βk ) then
terminate;
else
if (αk+1, βk+1) == (αk , βk ) & (αk+1, βk+1) , (αk , βk )
then
γk+1 = µkγk , (0 < µk < 1), back to (1);
else
γk+1 = γk , back to (1);
end
end
The prediction length γk and gradient step size η will affect the
convergence of the GA-SPP algorithm. With a too large prediction
length, the gradient computed with the forecasted strategy will
deviate too much from the gradient computed with the opponent’s
current strategy. As a result, the agent may adjust its strategy in the
improper direction and cause their strategies to fail to converge.
Following conditions ensure that γ and η are appropriate:
Condition 1: γ0 > 0, η > 0
Condition 2: 4γ 20δrδc < 1
Condition 3: η, γ0 < 1δr+δc
where δr = rmax − rmin , δc = cmax − cmin , rmax and cmax is the
maximum reward for the row and column agent, rmin and cmin is
the minimum reward for the row and column agent.
Condition 3 makes sure that the theoretical guarantee of Nash
convergence in the game settings analyzed in Section 4. In exper-
iments, the algorithm can still work in some other games if we
choose larger prediction length or let agents have different predic-
tion lengths.
3.1 Analysis of GA-SPP
In this section, we will show that if agents’ strategies converge
by following GA-SPP, then they must converge to a Nash equi-
librium, which is described by Proposition 1. Using this proposi-
tion, we will then prove the Nash convergence of GA-SPP in three
classes of games:m×n positive semi-definite games, a class of 2×n
general-sum games, and 2 × 2 general-sum games, respectively, in
the following sections.
Before proving Proposition 1, we will first show that if the pro-
jected gradients of a strategy pair are zero, then this strategy must
be a Nash equilibrium, which is described by Lemma 3.1. For brevity,
let ∂α denotes ∂αVr (α , β), ∂β denotes ∂βVr (α , β).
Lemma 3.1. In (m×n)-action games, if the projected partial deriva-
tives at a strategy pair (α ∗, β∗) are zero, that is, P∆1 (α ∗, ∂α ∗ ) = 0
and P∆2 (β∗, ∂β∗ ) = 0, then (α ∗, β∗) is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that (α ∗, β∗) is not a Nash equilibrium. Then
at least one agent, for example, the column agent, can increase
its expected payoff by changing its strategy unilaterally. Assume
that the improved point is (α ∗, β). Because of the convexity of
the strategy space ∆2 and the linear dependence of Vc (α , β) on β ,
then, for any ϵ > 0, (α ∗, (1− ϵ)β∗ + ϵβ) must also be an improved
point, which implies that the projected gradient of β at (α ∗, β∗) is
not zero. By contradiction, (α ∗, β∗) is a Nash equilibrium. □
Proposition 1. In 2-agent, m × n games, if two agents follow
GA-SPP with appropriate γ , η (satisfying Condition 1, 2, and 3) and
GA-SPP converges, then (α ∗, β∗) is a Nash equilibrium.
Here is a proof sketch (the detailed formal proof is described
in supplementary material1). According to Step 3 in the algorithm
1, if the strategy pair trajectory converges at (α ∗, β∗), then (α ∗, β∗) =
(α k+1, βk+1) = (αk , βk )or (α ∗, β∗) = limk→∞(α k+1, βk+1) = limk→∞(αk , βk ).
For both cases, we can have α ∗ = Π∆1 [α ∗ + η∂α ∗ ] and β∗ = Π∆2 [β∗ +
η∂β∗ ]. From here, we can show that, for any arbitrary small ϵ > 0,
α ∗ = Π∆1 [α ∗+ϵ∂α ∗ ]and β∗ = Π∆2 [β∗+ϵ∂β∗ ], which imply P∆1 (α ∗, ∂α ∗ ) =
0 and P∆2 (β∗, ∂β∗ ) = 0. Then according to Lemma 3.1, (α ∗, β∗) is a
Nash equilibrium.
4 CONVERGENCE OF GA-SPP
We will show the Nash convergence of GA-SPP in three classes of
games in this section.
4.1 m × n Positive Semi-Definite Games
A function Φ(v, w) is called a positive semi-definite function if it
obeys the inequality defined in [3]:
Φ(w, w) − Φ(w, v) − Φ(v, w) + Φ(v, v) ≥ 0. (4)
To facilitate the proof, we define the normalized value function
for a game:
Φ(v, w) = Vr (α 1, β2) +Vc (α 2, β1), (5)
wherev = (α 1, β1) ∈ {∆1 × ∆2},w = (α 2, β2) ∈ {∆1 × ∆2}.
Definition 1. A 2-agentm×n game is called positive semi-definite
(PSD) game if its normalized value function obeys
Φ(w, w) − Φ(w, v) − Φ(v, w) + Φ(v, v) ≥ 0. (6)
It means that for a PSD game, its payoff matrices satisfies
Vr (α 1, β1) +Vc (α 1, β1) +Vr (α 2, β2) +Vc (α 2, β2)
≥Vr (α 1, β2) +Vc (α 1, β2) +Vr (α 2, β1) +Vc (α 2, β1)
∀α 1, α 2 ∈ ∆1, ∀β1, β2 ∈ ∆2.
(7)
Zero-sum games are a subset of PSD games, because their value
functions satisfy Vr (α , β) + Vc (α , β) = 0, then both sides of
inequality 7 are equal to zero.
1https://drive.google.com/file/d/1TZeRf0xp4g4wg-JX7zA9TjqC2S619pAp/view?usp=
sharing
For a PSD game, if (α ∗, β∗) is a Nash equilibrium and v∗ =
(α ∗, β∗), then its normalized function obeys
⟨∇2Φ(w, w), w −v∗⟩ ≥ 0 ∀w ∈ {∆1 × ∆2}. (8)
In the proof of Theorem 1, we will use this inequality.
theorem 1. If, in a 2-agent,m × n iterated positive semi-definite
norm-form game, both agents follow the GA-SPP algorithm (with
Condition 1, 2, and 3), then their strategies will converge to a Nash
equilibrium.
Proof. Motivated by [2], our proof will use some variational
inequalities techniques.
From the first and second step of GA-SPP (Algorithm 1), we have
estimates
|αk+1 − αk+1 | ≤ |γk∂αVr (αk , βk ) − η∂αVr (αk , βk+1)|,
|βk+1 − βk+1 | ≤ |γk∂βVc (αk , βk ) − η∂βVc (αk+1, βk )|.
(9)
We present the first and second step of GA-SPP in the form of
variational inequalities:
⟨αk+1 − αk − γk∂αVr (αk , βk ), z1 − αk+1⟩ ≥ 0 ∀z1 ∈ ∆1,
⟨βk+1 − βk − γk∂βVc (αk , βk ), z2 − βk+1⟩ ≥ 0 ∀z2 ∈ ∆2;
(10)
⟨αk+1 − αk − η∂αVr (αk , βk+1), z1 − αk+1⟩ ≥ 0 ∀z1 ∈ ∆1,
⟨βk+1 − βk − η∂βVc (αk+1, βk ), z2 − βk+1⟩ ≥ 0 ∀z2 ∈ ∆2.
(11)
Let v =
(
α 1
β1
)
. Put z1 = α ∗,z2 = β∗ in Eq. 11, then set z1 =
αk+1,z2 = βk+1 in Eq. 10, and take into account of Eq. 9, we
can get (the detailed computation is listed in our supplementary
material)
⟨vk+1 −vk , v∗ −vk+1⟩ + ⟨vk+1 −vk , vk+1 −vk+1⟩
+η⟨∇2Φ(vk+1, vk+1), v∗ −vk+1⟩
+h2∥∇2Φ(vk , vk ) − ∇2Φ(vk+1, vk+1)∥2 ≥ 0,
(12)
where h = max{γ0,η}. By means of identity, the first two scalar
products in Eq. 12 can be rewritten as
1
2 ∥vk −v
∗∥2 − 12 ∥vk+1 −v
∗∥2−
1
2 ∥vk+1 −vk+1∥
2 − 12 ∥vk+1 −vk ∥
2.
(13)
Set w = vk+1 in Eq. 8, then the third term in Eq.12 is non-
positive. For the last term of Eq. 12, if ∇2Φ(vk , vk ) satisfies the
Lipschitz condition with constant L, then following estimate is
correct
|∇2Φ(vk , vk ) − ∇2Φ(vk+1, vk+1)| ≤ L|vk+1 −vk |. (14)
Now put Eq. 13 and Eq. 14 in Eq. 12, we can yield
∥vk+1 −v∗∥2 + ∥vk+1 −vk+1∥2+
(1 − 2h2L2)∥vk+1 −vk ∥2 ≤ ∥vk −v∗∥2.
(15)
Note that ∇2Φ(vk , vk ) = ∂αVr (α , β)+∂βVc (α , β). According
to Eq. 2, ∂αVr (α , β) is a function of β , ∂βVc (α , β) is a function
of α . The maximum value of 2-norm of ∂α is not greater than
δr
2/2, and not greater than δc 2/2 for 2-norm of ∂β . So the Lipschitz
constant L ≤ δr√
2
+
δc√
2
. According to Condition 3,h =max{γ0, η} <
1
δc+δr
, so hL <
√
2
2 and 1 − 2h2L2 > 0. Sum up inequality Eq. 15
from k = 0 to k = K , we get
∥vK +1 −v∗∥2 +
K∑
k=0
∥vk+1 −vk+1∥2+
(1 − 2h2L2)
K∑
k=0
∥vk+1 −vk ∥2 ≤ ∥v0 −v∗∥2.
(16)
From the gained inequality (Eq. 16) the bound of trajectory fol-
lows
∥vK +1 −v∗∥2 ≤ ∥v0 −v∗∥2, (17)
and the series are convergent
K∑
k=0
∥vk+1 −vk+1∥2 < ∞,
K∑
k=0
∥vk+1 −vk ∥2 < ∞.
As a result, limk→∞ ∥vk+1 − vk+1∥2 = 0, limk→∞ ∥vk+1 −
vk ∥2 = 0, so limk→∞ ∥vk+1−vk ∥2 = 0. It implies limk→∞ ∥αk+1−
αk ∥2 = 0 and limk→∞ ∥βk+1 − βk ∥2 = 0.
So GA-SPP can converge. With Proposition 1, GA-SPP must
converge to a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, proof of Theorem 1 is
completed. □
theorem 2. If, in a 2-agent,m × n iterated positive semi-definite
norm-form game, one agent follows the GA-SPP algorithm (with
Condition 1, 2, and 3), another agent uses GA, then their strategies
will converge to a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of this theorem is omitted, which is similar to that of
Theorem 1.
4.2 A Subclass of 2 × n General-Sum Games
In this section, we will show that GA-SPP converges to a Nash
equilibrium in a subclass of 2-agent 2×n general games (Theorem 3).
A 2-agent, 2 × n, general-sum normal-form game’s payoff matri-
ces can be written as
R =
[
r11 ... r1n
r21 ... r2n
]
, C =
[
c11 ... c1n
c21 ... c2n
]
.
Let
r1 = [r11 ... r1,n−1]T, r2 = [r21 ... r2,n−1]T,
c1 = [c11 ... c1,n−1]T, c2 = [c21 ... c2,n−1]T.
Then agents’ expected payoffs (Eq. 1) are
Vr (α , β) = (αβT)r1 + r1n (α(1 − βTen−1))
+ (1 − α)βTr2 + r2n ((1 − α)(1 − βTen−1)),
Vc (α , β) = (αβT )c1 + c1n (α(1 − βTen−1))
+ (1 − α)βTc2 + c2n ((1 − α)(1 − βTen−1)).
(18)
The gradients (Eq. 2) can be written as
∂αVr (α , β) = ∂Vr (α , β)
∂α
= βTur + br ,
∂βVc (α , β) =
∂Vc (α , β)
∂β
= αuc + bc ,
(19)
where br = r1n − r2n , bc = c2 − c2nen−1, ur = r1 − r2 − bren−1,
and uc = c1 − c2 − (c1n − c2n )en−1.
theorem 3. If, in a 2-agent, 2×n, norm-form game, if there exists
a δ > 0 such that the payoff matrices obey
ur + δuc = 0, (20)
and both agents follow the GA-SPP algorithm (with Condition 1, 2,
and 3), then their strategies will converge to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. For a 2-agent 2×n game, if we put Eq. 18 into Definition 1,
then we deriveur +uc = 0. It shows that 2×n games in Theorem 3
with δ = 1 are PSD games.
First we consider 2 × n positive semi-definite games (ur +uc =
0). According to Theorem 1, in this particular case, GA-SPP can
converge to a Nash Equilibrium. It means the following iteration
can converge:
αk+1 = Π∆1 [αk + γk (βTkur1 + br1 )],
βk+1 = Π∆2 [βk − γk (αkur1 + bc1 )];
αk+1 = Π∆1 [αk + η(β
T
kur1 + br1 )],
βk+1 = Π∆2 [βk − η(αkur1 + bc1 )].
(21)
For brevity, we omit step 3 of GA-SPP.
For a 2 × n, norm-form game that obeys Eq. 23, we have ur2 +
δuc2 = 0. Let x = α√δ , y =
√
δβ . If α and β follows GA-SPP, then
the update rule of x and y is
xk+1 = Π∆x [xk + γk (yTkur2 +
br2√
δ
)],
yk+1 = Π∆y [yk − γk (αkur2 +
√
δbc2 )];
xk+1 = Π∆x [xk + η(yTkur2 +
br2√
δ
)],
yk+1 = Π∆y [yk − η(xkur2 +
√
δbc2 )].
(22)
Comparing Eq. 22 with Eq. 21, (x ,y) can be viewed as a strategy
pair of another 2 × n PSD game following GA-SPP. Notice that
the proof of Theorem 1 only requires that the valid space is a
bounded convex set. Therefore, if (α , β) follows GA-SPP, (x ,y) can
converge, then (x , y) can still converge in 2 × n, norm-form game
can converge.
With Proposition 1, we finish the proof of Theorem 3. □
theorem 4. If, in a 2-agent, 2×n, norm-form game, if there exists
δ > 0, and the payoff matrices obey
ur + δuc = 0, (23)
and one agent follow the GA-SPP algorithm (with Condition 1, 2, and
3), another agent uses GA, then their strategies will converge to a
Nash equilibrium.
The proof of this theorem is omitted, which is similar to that of
Theorem 3.
4.3 2 × 2 General-Sum Games
In this section, we will prove the Nash convergence of GA-SPP in
2 × 2 general-sum games.
theorem 5. If, in a 2-agent, 2 × 2, iterated general-sum game,
both agents follow the GA-SPP algorithm (with Condition 1, 2, and 3),
then their strategies will converge to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. With Proposition 1, in order to prove Theorem 5, we just
need to prove the convergence of GA-SPP in 2 × 2 games, which is
accomplished by Lemma 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. □
Next, we will analyze the structure of 2 × 2 games firstly, and
then show the convergence in different cases respectively.
In a 2-agent, 2-action game, the reward functions (Eq. 1) can be
written as
Vr (α , β) = r11(αβ) + r12(α(1 − β)) + r21((1 − α)β)
+ r22((1 − α)(1 − β)),
Vc (α , β) = c11(αβ) + c12(α(1 − β)) + c21((1 − α)β)
+ c22((1 − α)(1 − β)).
And the gradient function (Eq. 2) can be written as
∂αVr (α , β) = ∂Vr (α , β)
∂α
= ur β + br ,
∂βVc (α , β) =
∂Vc (α , β)
∂β
= ucα + bc ,
whereur = r11+r22−r12−r21,br = r12−r22,uc = c11+c22−c12−c21,
and bc = c21 − c22. We have |ur | ≤ 2δr , |uc | ≤ 2δc .
We can formulate the first two update rules of GA-SPP (1):
αk+1 = Π∆[αk + η∂αkVr (αk , Π∆[βk + γ ∂βk , βk ])],
βk+1 = Π∆[βk + η∂βkVc (βk , Π∆[αk + γ ∂αk , αk ])],
(24)
where ∆ = ∆1 = ∆2 = [0, 1].
To prove the Nash convergence of GA-SPP, we will examine
the dynamics of the strategy pair following GA-SPP. In a 2-agent,
2-action, general-sum game, (α , β) can be viewed as a point in R2
constrained to lie in the unit space.
According to Eq. 24, if (αk , βk ) is a unconstrained point, then
value of (αk+1, βk+1) is[
αk+1
βk+1
]
−
[
αk
βk
]
= η
[
γkuruc ur
uc γkuruc
] [
αk
βk
]
+η
[
γkurbc + br
γkucbr + bc
]
.
(25)
We denote the 2 × 2 matrix in Eq. 25 as U. If the matrix U is
invertible, in the unconstrained condition, there exists and only
exists one point so that the left hand side of Eq. 25 is zero. We
call this point the center (or origin) and denote it as (αc , βc ). The
eigenvalues of U is given by
λ1 = γkuruc +
√
uruc and λ2 = γkuruc −
√
uruc . (26)
According to Condition 2 (4γ 2kδrδc < 1) and |ur | ≤ 2δr , |uc | ≤ 2δc ,
then γ 2kuruc < 1. There are three cases of U:
• Case 1: uruc = 0, i.e., U is not invertible;
• Case 2:uruc < 0, i.e., having two imaginary conjugate eigen-
values with negative real;
• Case 3: uruc > 0, i.e., having two real eigenvalues.
Figure 1: Strategy updating directions of the GA-SPP. a)
when U has real eigenvalues and b) when U has imaginary
eigenvalues with negative real part.
To prove Theorem 5, we only need to show that GA-SPP always
leads the strategy pair to converge in these three cases.
Lemma 4.1. If, in a 2-agent, 2-action, iterated general-sum game,
U is not invertible, for any initial strategy pair, GA-SPP leads the
strategy pair trajectory to converge to a Nash equilibrium (NE) with
finite steps.
Proof. From Eq. 26, ifU is not invertible, thenuruc = 0. Assume
uc = 0 (the analysis for the case ur = 0 is analogous and thus
omitted for brevity).
According to Eq. 25, βk+1 = Π∆[βk + ηbc ]. Because ηbc is con-
stant and β ∈ [0, 1], strategy β will no longer change after finite
steps. We denote this value by β∗. Then, αk+1 = Π∆[αk + η(ur β∗ +
br )]. Because η(ur β∗ + br ) is a constant and α ∈ [0, 1], after a
certain number (finite) of steps, strategy α will also stop chang-
ing. We denote this value by α∗. So in this case, the strategy pair
will converge to (α∗, β∗), and with Proposition 1, this is a Nash
equilibrium.
Note that the index of ηk was omitted in the proof, which is
because the situation of (αk+1, βk+1) = (αk , βk ) & (αk+1, βk+1) ,
(αk , βk ) did not occur in this case. Lemma 4.3 also has this property.
□
Lemma 4.2. If, in a 2-agent, 2-action, iterated general-sum game,
U has two imaginary conjugate eigenvalues with negative real, for
any initial strategy pair, GA-SPP leads the strategy pair trajectory to
converge to a NE.
Proof. Since uruc < 0, there exists a δ such that ur + δuc = 0.
This is a 2-dimensional situation of Theorem 3. So GA-SPP can
converge to a NE. □
In the rest of this section, we will introduce Lemma 4.3 and the
basic idea of proof. For the detailed mathematical proof, we refer
readers to the supplementary material.
Lemma 4.3. If, in a 2-agent, 2-action, iterated general-sum game,
U has real eigenvalues, for any initial strategy pair, GA-SPP leads the
strategy pair trajectory to converge to a point that is a NE.
Before proof, we first introduce some variables to simplify the
expressions.
If U is invertible, then uruc , 0. Let x = α + bcuc , y = β +
br
ur ,
Eq. 25 can be reformulated as:[
xk+1
yk+1
]
−
[
xk
yk
]
= η
[
γuruc ur
uc γuruc
] [
xk
yk
]
(27)
By setting the left hand side of Eq. 27 to zero, we can get an equation,
the only solution of which is x = 0, y = 0.
Now we give the proof of Lemma 4.3.
Proof. From Eq. 26, real eigenvalues implyuruc > 0. So without
the loss of generality, we assume that ur > 0 and uc > 0 (the
analysis for the case ur < 0 and uc < 0 is analogous and thus
omitted).
Proof of Lemma 4.3 depends on the location of (αc , βc ), which
has three possibilities:
(1) both αc and βc are in the valid probability range [0,1],
(2) only one of αc , βc is in the valid probability range [0,1],
(3) neither αc nor βc is in the valid probability range [0,1].
Proofs of convergence in these three cases are given in Property
4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, respectively. □
Notice that U has two real eigenvalues: λ1 > 0 and λ2 < 0 and
two nonparallel eigenvectors. The central point (x = 0, y = 0)
with two eigenvectors (v1 = [√ur , √uc ], v2 = [√ur , −√uc ]) can
form a new 2D coordinate system. The basic idea of proof is to
analyze coordinates of the strategy pair update trajectory in the
new coordinate system. To be brief, we introduce two functions to
compute it instead of converting coordinate.
F = x +
√
ur
uc
y, G = x −
√
ur
uc
y. (28)
Property 4.1. If U has real eigenvalues, both of αc , βc are in
the valid probability range([0, 1]), GA-SPP leads the strategy pair
trajectory to converge to a NE.
Proof. As shown in Fig. 2(a), the initial point will affect the
Nash convergence result because there are three Nash equilibrium
points.
The first case is F0 = 0. Then the strategy pair point will keep
staying in the line F = 0 while the absolute value of G decreases,
whichmeans that the point moves to the center point (F = 0,G = 0),
i.e., (α∗, β∗). For example, if P2 is the initial point, the point will
travel along the line F = 0 and moves to (F = 0,G = 0). We can
compute Fk+1 and Gk+1 by
Gk+1 = (1 + ηλ2)Gk , Fk+1 = (1 + ηλ1)Fk . (29)
According to Condition 1, 2 and 3, 0 < (1 + ηλ2) < 1, so the
GA-SPP will converge to (F = 0, G = 0), i.e., (x = 0, y = 0).
Another case is when F0 > 0, from Fig. 2(a), we can tell that
the strategy pair point first touches the boundary xmax (α = 1) or
ymax (β = 1) after finite iteration steps, after then it travels along
the boundary and moves to (xmax , ymax ). For example, if P1 is the
initial point, the point will touch the boundary α = 1 (i.e., xmax ),
then it travels along α = 1 and moves to (xmax , ymax ). Without
no more than one exceptional case, we can derive Fk+1 > Fk in
each iteration. From the monotone bounded theorem, the GA-SPP
will converge to Fmax , i.e., (xmax , ymax ).
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Figure 2: Updating directions of strategy pair in Lemma 4.3. (a) Both αc and βc are in the valid probability range, F (P1) > 0,
F (P2) = 0; (b) only one of αc and βc is in the valid range, F (P3) = 0, F (P4) < 0; (c) neither αc and βc is in the valid range.
Situation when F0 < 0 is similar to that when F0 > 0, so we omit
it for brevity.
In all, GA-SPP can converge for any initial strategy pair. □
Property 4.2. When U has real eigenvalues and only one of αc
and βc is in the valid probability range, GA-SPP leads the strategy
pair trajectory to converge to a NE.
Proof of Property 4.2 can be classified into 4 cases. Without loss
of generality, we just consider one of them, where βc < 0 and
αc ∈ [0, 1]. As shown in Fig. 2(b), we can also divide the proof
into 3 parts: F0 > 0, F0 < 0, and F0 = 0. If the point is in the part
F > 0, according to Property 4.1, the algorithm will converge to
(xmax , ymax ). If F0 ≤ 0, we can see that the point will first touch a
boundary of the valid probability space, after that it will move into
the part F > 0. For example, if P3 (F = 0) is the initial point, the
point will travel along line F = 0 until it hits the boundary, then
it will be projected to the subspace where F > 0. If P4 (F < 0) is
the initial point, it will touch the boundary β = 0 (ymin ) and then
y remains ymin while x increases until it move into the subspace
where F > 0.
Property 4.3. If U has real eigenvalues and neither αc nor βc is
in the valid probability range [0, 1], GA-SPP leads the strategy pair
trajectory to converge to a NE.
Updating directions of strategy pair is shown in Fig. 2(c) for this
case. For the detailed proof, please refer to supplementary material.
theorem 6. If, in a 2-agent, 2 × 2, iterated general-sum game,
one agent follow the GA-SPP algorithm (with Condition 1, 2, and 3),
another agent uses GA, then their strategies will converge to a NE
The proof is omitted, which is similar to that of Theorem 5.
5 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS IN
NORMAL-FORM GAMES
In this section, we will illustrate GA-SPP in games with experiments
and compare GA-SPP with IGA-PP and GIGA-WoLF, both of which
have theoretical guarantees, in some larger games.
5.1 Benchmark games
We first illustrate the results of GA-SPP on four representative
benchmark games presented in Tab. 1. GA-SPP converges to NE in
all of these games (Fig. 3).
Table 1: Benchmark games
(a) Prisoners’ Dilemma
Silent Betray
Silent (-1,-1) (-3,0)
Betray (0,-3) (-2,-2)
(b) Chicken
Swerve Straight
Swerve (-2,-2) (1,-1)
Straight (-1,1) (-1,-1)
(c) Battle of Sexes
Opera Football
Opera (3,2) (1,1)
Football (0,0) (2,3)
(d) Rock-Paper-Scissors
R P S
R (0,0) (-1,1) (1,-1)
P (1,-1) (0,0) (-1,1)
S (-1,1) (1,-1) (0,0)
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Figure 3: Action probabilities of row agent following GA-
SPP in four benchmark games. Parameters: η = 0.001, γ = 0.1.
Initial polices: (0.7, 0.3) and (0.3, 0.7).
5.2 Games beyond theoretical settings
We also evaluate GA-SPP in Shapley’s game and a 2 × 3 game,
presented in Tab. 2. Although the theoretical analyses of GA-SPP
have not covered these games, empirical results show that it still
converge. We now compare GA-SPP, GIGA-WoLF, and IGA-PP in
these two games.
Fig. 4 shows the row player’s action probabilities over time if both
players follow GA-SPP, GIGA-WoLF, or IGA-PP in Shapley’s game
respectively. GIGA-WoLF fails to converge in this non-zero sum
game, but GA-SPP and IGA-PP can converge to a Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Comparison between GA-SPP, GIGA-WoLF, and IGA-PP in Shapley’s game. GIGA-WoLF cannot converge while GA-
SPP and IGA-PP converge to NE. GA-SPP has a slighter oscillation. Parameters: γ = 3, η = 0.001. Initial polices: (0.1, 0.8, 0.1)
and (0.8, 0.1, 0.1).
Table 2: Games with larger settings
(a) Shapley’s Game
C1 C2 C3
R1 (0,0) (1,0) (0,1)
R2 (0,1) (0,0) (1,0)
R3 (1,0) (0,1) (0,0)
(b) A 2x3 Game
C1 C2 C3
R1 (3,3) (0,5) (1,-2)
R2 (2,2) (1,1) (-1,0)
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Figure 5: Comparison between GA-SPP, and IGA-PP in a 2×3
game under different prediction lengths. IGA-PP’s conver-
gence to Nash Equilibrium is affected by prediction length,
while GA-SPP can always converge to NE. Parameters: η =
0.001, γ = 0.01 in upper and γ = 0.1 in lower. Initial polices:
(0.8, 0.2) and (0.1, 0.8, 0.1).
Fig. 5 shows results of GA-SPP and IGA-PP in a 2× 3 game under
different prediction lengths. Although IGA-PP can converge, it does
not converge to a Nash equilibrium. On the contrary, the strategies
lead by GA-SPP successfully converge to Nash equilibrium under
different prediction lengths. The essential reason is that GA-SPP
projects the predicted strategies to a valid space at every step.
By examining with different learning rates, we observe that GA-
SPP often converges faster thanGIGA-WoLF. A possible explanation
is introduced in [27]. We do not show these results for sake of space.
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Figure 6: Following GA-SPP, action probabilities of agents fail to converge
in three player matching pennies. Parameters: η = 0.001, γ = 0.3. Initial
polices: (0.1, 0.9), (0.4, 0.6) and (0.7, 0.3).
5.3 Problem games
Although GA-SPP has better performance than other MAL algo-
rithms, the convergence of GA-SPP is not perfect. As shown in Fig. 6,
in the three player matching pennies, GA-SPP cannot converge with
a constant prediction length.
This failed case show the difficulties of MAL work and indicate
that gradient method may not be the ideal way to handle a complex
game. Because dynamic of gradient method in such game is not
linearly, the chaotic phenomenon will occur. We may need different
approaches to deal with such problems. In order to make MARL
work effectively in more cases, it is important to analyze and solve
these problems.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper introduced a new gradient-based multi-agent learning
algorithm, called gradient-ascent with shrinking policy prediction
(GA-SPP). We proved Nash convergence of GA-SPP with a finite
step size in three classes of general-sum games: m × n positive
semi-definite games, a subclass of 2 × n general-sum games, and
2 × 2 general-sum games, respectively, which provide a stronger
theoretical guarantee than existing gradient-based MAL algorithms.
We also empirically verified the strong convergence property of
GA-SPP with example games. In future work, we aim to relax as-
sumptions of GA-SPP and extend it to stochastic games where each
agent only has observations of their in-game payoffs and has no
gradient information about other agents.
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